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ANYTHING UNDER THE SUN MADE BY HUMANS: 
PATENT LAW DOCTRINES AS ENDOGENOUS 
INSTITUTIONS FOR COMMERCIALIZING INNOVATION 
James E. Daily∗ 
F. Scott Kieff∗∗ 
ABSTRACT 
This Essay outlines a comparative institutional analysis among various 
doctrines in patent law to show how they can have different impacts on the way 
inventions are commercialized. It builds on a prior body of work about the 
positive role that property rights in patents can play in commercializing 
innovation to show how recent shifts in approaches to the particular legal 
doctrine known as patentable subject matter can be expected to have different 
effects on the commercialization of inventions than prior approaches. It 
concludes that, to the extent society wants to increase the overall rate of 
invention commercialization and increase overall competition as reflected in 
diversity in firm size among participants in the markets for commercializing 
innovation, society should consider reversing course on the law of patentable 
subject matter and return to an approach that is closer to the “anything under 
the sun made by man” view that was championed by the Supreme Court in the 
1980s and by Congress through most of the second half of the twentieth 




 ∗ Research Associate, Stanford University Hoover Institution Project on Commercializing Innovation.  
 ∗∗ Fred C. Stevenson Research Professor, The George Washington University Law School; Ray & Louise 
Knowles Senior Fellow, Stanford University Hoover Institution.  
This work is part of the Hoover Task Force on Property Rights, Freedom, and Prosperity, which studies 
the philosophical, historical, legal, and economic foundations of property rights, as well as the Hoover Project 
on Commercializing Innovation, which studies the law, economics, and politics of innovation and which is 
available online at www.innovation.hoover.org. 
DAILY&KEIFF GALLEYSPROOFS1 6/3/2013  10:29 AM 
968 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:967 
INTRODUCTION  .............................................................................................. 968 
 I. A PRÉCIS ON INSTITUTIONS  ................................................................ 969 
 II. BASIC GOALS FOR A PATENT SYSTEM AND BROAD INSTITUTIONAL 
DESIGN  ............................................................................................... 971 
 III. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO THE PATENTABLE SUBJECT 
MATTER DOCTRINE  ............................................................................ 974 
CONCLUSION  .................................................................................................. 980 
INTRODUCTION 
This conference volume arises out of the 2012 Randolph W. Thrower 
Symposium, which is part of the endowed lecture series sponsored by Mr. 
Thrower’s family and hosted by the Emory Law Journal and Emory University 
School of Law. The 2012 symposium was entitled “Innovation for the Modern 
Era: Law, Policy, and Legal Practice in a Changing World.” This Essay was 
presented on the panel entitled “The Role of Institutions in Fostering and 
Disseminating Technological Innovation” and offers a comparative 
institutional analysis of different approaches to one of today’s hot topics in 
modern patent law—the issue of patentable subject matter1—to elucidate the 
ways different approaches to institutional design in patent law can have 
different impacts on the markets for commercializing innovation. 
This Essay proceeds as follows: Part I introduces a précis on institutions 
and their application to intellectual property. Part II highlights some links that 
can be found between, on the one hand, a patent system’s overall goals and the 
types of dispute resolution it conducts, and on the other hand, the different 
relationships these set up between the government and market actors. Part III 
lays out as a benchmark the “anything under the sun made by man” approach 
towards patentable subject matter that was featured in the 1952 Patent Act, 
championed by the Supreme Court in the 1980s, and followed by Congress 
through most of the second half of the twentieth century,2 as well as a 
 
 1 See, e.g., Andrew Pollack, Justices Send Back Gene Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2012, at B1 
(describing case about whether technologies relating to genes associated with breast and ovarian cancer are 
eligible subject matter for patenting); Eduardo Porter, Tech Suits Endanger Innovation, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 
2012, at B1 (describing case about whether technologies relating to computer software are eligible subject 
matter for patenting).  
 2 See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980); 
S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952). The historical and revision notes for 35 
U.S.C. § 101 state that the 1952 Act expanded the definition of process to include a “new use of a known 
process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material,” 35 U.S.C. § 101 hist. n. (2006), which is 
highly relevant to many technologies such as software, which is fundamentally about finding new uses for 
DAILY&KIEFF GALLEYSPROOFS1 6/3/2013  10:29 AM 
2013] ANYTHING UNDER THE SUN MADE BY HUMANS 969 
contrasting more subjective approach the Court again deployed in its most 
recent cases. This Essay concludes by elucidating some reasons why, to the 
extent society wants to increase the overall rate of invention commercialization 
and increase overall competition as reflected in diversity in firm size among 
participants in the markets for commercializing innovation, society should 
consider largely returning to the prior approach toward the law of patentable 
subject matter, updating only its gender biased language. 
I. A PRÉCIS ON INSTITUTIONS 
In the social sciences, the term institutions refers to constraints that are 
human imposed—laws, rules, norms, and their enforcement characteristics; 
and the field known as New Institutional Social Sciences, including the 
narrower field known as New Institutional Economics, studies the nature and 
degree of the impact that institutions can have on overall economic and social 
performance.3 Institutions are usually considered to be largely endogenous to a 
given democratic society—meaning that they are seen as internally generated 
rather than imposed from outside—because it is generally at least some subset 
of the people in that society that decides which institutions are implemented.4 
This Essay outlines a comparative institutional analysis among various 
doctrines in patent law to show how they can have different impacts on the 
way inventions are commercialized. It recognizes that one size rarely fits all 
because different societies have different goals they intend to further within the 
systems of institutions they implement; that no one approach to furthering any 
particular set of goals is perfect; and that it may make sense to eliminate patent 
systems in their entirety. In so doing, this Essay builds on a prior body of work 
 
existing machines (i.e., computers). See Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-
208, § 616, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-67 to -69 (1996) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2006)) 
(providing a safe harbor for certain medical methods but declining to exclude them from patentability); 
American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501, 1501A-552 to -57 (codified 
as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2006)) (providing a prior user defense for business method patents but 
declining to exclude them from patentability).  
 3 For a general discussion of these terms in relation to intellectual property, see F. Scott Kieff, 
Coordination, Property, and Intellectual Property: An Unconventional Approach to Anticompetitive Effects 
and Downstream Access, 56 EMORY L.J. 327, 338–40 (2006); and Henry E. Smith, Institutions and 
Indirectness in Intellectual Property, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2083, 2083–101 (2009). 
 4 See Stanley L. Engerman & Kenneth L. Sokoloff, Debating the Role of Institutions in Political and 
Economic Development: Theory, History, and Findings, 11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 119, 124–25 (2008) 
(discussing the definition of institutions and their endogenous and exogenous origins). In contrast, sometimes 
laws are imposed largely by outside forces, such as when a society is controlled by a foreign power. For more 
on endogenous institutions, see id.  
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about the positive role that property rights in patents can play in 
commercializing innovation.5 We show how recent shifts in approaches to the 
particular laws about what types of subject matter are eligible for patent 
protection can be expected to have different effects on the commercialization 
of inventions than prior approaches. 
The particular institution that is the focus of this Essay is the area of patent 
law known as the patentable subject matter requirement, which is distinct from 
the other more widely known legal requirements for a valid patent, such as 
novelty, nonobviousness (known outside the United States as inventive step), 
and adequate disclosure.6 The patentable subject matter requirement is an 
additional requirement that is designed to entirely exclude from patent 
eligibility particular fields of inventive activity, even if they satisfy those other 
requirements for patentability.7 Common targets of the patentable subject 
matter requirement include those inventions relating to life, such as 
biotechnology,8 those relating to computers, such as software,9 those relating to 
business, such as financial techniques,10 and those relating to fun, such as 
sports moves.11 This area of the law has again become a hot spot, and the 
Supreme Court recently decided two high-profile cases in it: Bilski v. Kappos, 
involving finance and software, and Mayo Collaborative Services v. 
Prometheus Labs, involving biotechnology.12 
 
 5 See Stephen H. Haber et al., On the Importance to Economic Success of Property Rights in Finance 
and Innovation, 26 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 215 (2008) (surveying recent developments surrounding property 
rights and their economic impact).  
 6 See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006) (amended 2011 and 2012) (setting forth the substantive requirement in 
patent law for novelty); id. §§ 103, 112 (2006) (setting forth the substantive requirements in patent law for 
nonobviousness and disclosure). For more on all of these requirements, see F. SCOTT KIEFF ET AL., PRINCIPLES 
OF PATENT LAW 154–688 (5th ed. 2011), which discusses disclosure, novelty, and nonobviousness. 
 7 Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Wisdom of the Ages or Dead-Hand Control? Patentable Subject Matter for 
Diagnostic Methods After In re Bilski, 3 CASE W. RES. J.L. TECH. & INTERNET 1, 1 n.2 (2012). 
 8 See Eisenberg, supra note 7.  
 9 James Bessen, A Generation of Software Patents (Bos. Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 11-31, 
2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1868979. 
 10 John F. Duffy, Why Business Method Patents?, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1247 (2011). 
 11 F. Scott Kieff et al., It’s Your Turn, but It’s My Move: Intellectual Property Protection for Sports 
“Moves,” 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 765 (2008–2009). 
 12 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012) (regarding a patent on 
methods for adjusting the dosage of a drug in response to metabolite levels in a patient’s blood); Bilski v. 
Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (regarding patent on methods for hedging against the risk of price changes in 
the commodities market). The Court has also vacated and remanded other important subject matter cases to the 
Federal Circuit to be considered in light of Mayo. E.g., Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & 
Trademark Office (Myriad II), 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir.), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 1794, remanded to 689 F.3d 
1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Myriad IV) (regarding patent on BRCA1&2 breast cancer markers in cancer screening); 
Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, 657 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (regarding patent on methods of distributing 
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II. BASIC GOALS FOR A PATENT SYSTEM AND BROAD INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 
While a searching study of patent theory is beyond the scope of this Essay, 
this Part offers a brief outline of some basic goals and broad institutional 
features of the patent system to set the stage for the more focused comparative 
institutional analysis later in the Essay on the topic of patentable subject 
matter. The discussion in this Part is designed to highlight the types of links 
that can be found between, on the one hand, a patent system’s goals and the 
types of dispute resolution it conducts, and on the other hand, the different 
relationships these set up between the government and market actors. 
Although patents often are seen as tools that societies use to encourage 
inventors to invent, significant and politically diverse voices among those 
studying and implementing the U.S. patent system have instead focused on the 
role of strong and predictable rules for patent procurement and enforcement in 
facilitating competition and the commercialization of inventions.13 Economic 
history has taught that a defining feature of the early U.S. patent system that 
was central to its economic success was the way in which it used a property 
rights approach to facilitate private ordering.14 Analysis of legal history reveals 
that the principal draftsman of the statute that implemented the patent system 
that operated in the United States from 1952 through the end of the twentieth 
century was explicit in focusing on the role of the system in facilitating 
coordination among many diverse market participants in order to 
commercialize innovation, rather than on getting inventions made.15 As 
Abraham Lincoln described it, the patent system “added the fuel of interest to 
 
copyrighted products over the Internet in exchange for viewing an advertisement), vacated sub nom. 
Wildtangent, Inc. v. Ultramercial, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 2431 (2012). 
 13 B. Zorina Khan & Kenneth L. Sokoloff, History Lessons: The Early Development of Intellectual 
Property Institutions in the United States, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 2001, at 233, 235. 
 14 See, e.g., id.; Naomi R. Lamoreaux & Kenneth L. Sokoloff, Intermediaries in the U.S. Market for 
Technology, 1870–1920, in FINANCE, INTERMEDIARIES, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 209, 210–11 (Stanley 
L. Engerman et al. eds., 2003). 
 15 See Giles S. Rich, The Relation Between Patent Practices and the Anti-Monopoly Laws, 24 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 159 (1942), reprinted in 14 FED. CIR. B.J. 21, 34 (2004) (part of five-part series of 
articles written by principal drafter of the 1952 Patent Act). Diverse jurists immediately recognized the power 
of the 1952 Act in strengthening patents and leading progressives among them championed such strong patents 
as tools for helping smaller market entrants compete against larger, established firms. See Reiner v. I. Leon 
Co., 285 F.2d 501, 503 (2d Cir. 1960) (“There can be no doubt that the Act of 1952 meant to change the slow 
but steady drift of judicial decision that had been hostile to patents . . . .”); Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., 128 
F.2d 632, 643 (2d Cir. 1942) (Frank, J., concurring) (setting forth views of a well-recognized progressive jurist 
on the role of predictable rules for patent enforcement in helping a smaller “David” compete with a larger 
“Goliath”). 
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the fire of genius, in the discovery and production of new and useful things.”16 
As shown through analysis of legal history, this approach to strong patents has 
enjoyed support across the U.S. political spectrum.17 
While focusing on getting inventions made has much appeal, the difference 
between the goals of inventing and commercializing reveals some key 
institutional features of the patent system. Consider that the goal of getting 
inventions made generally involves the use of targeted incentives that can be 
provided by a host of alternatives to patents, such as tax credits, prizes, grants, 
rewards, and the like.18 Providing these targeted incentives requires an 
immense amount of information about who exactly should be targeted and how 
large the incentive should be, and those operating under the regime have strong 
incentives to seek their own rewards but only weak incentives to provide the 
information needed to discipline the governmental giver to be more frugal in 
giving rewards to others.19 Not only is amassing all of that information hard for 
the government to do, but it is likely that large, established market actors will 
be better able than smaller market entrants to wield the powerful political 
influence needed to get the government to act on that information. 
One feature that patents have in contrast with other such rewards is that the 
patent applicants themselves bring to the government much of the information 
needed to grant and enforce the patent. The patent applicant does this through 
the process of submitting and prosecuting their patent applications. In addition, 
competitors of the patentee and the patentee’s business associates, who are 
 
 16 Abraham Lincoln, Second Lecture on Discoveries and Inventions (Feb. 11, 1859), in 3 THE 
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 356, 363 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953) (emphasis added and omitted). 
 17 See, e.g., Judge Pauline Newman, Foreword: The Federal Circuit in Perspective, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 
821, 822–23 (2005) (reviewing history of the 1982 statute designed to strengthen the U.S. patent system and 
included as a major domestic policy initiative of the Carter Administration before being signed into law by the 
Reagan Administration); see also Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 171 (2006)) (creating the U.S. Court of Federal Claims); The Indus. 
Advisory Subcomm. on Patent & Info. Policy, Report on Patent Policy, in ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON 
INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION: FINAL REPORT 147, 155 (1979). 
 18 See, e.g., Michael Kremer, Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for Encouraging Innovation, 113 Q.J. ECON. 
1137 (1998) (suggesting the government buy out patents after conducting an auction to determine an 
appropriate buyout price to better address these same fields and others); Steven Shavell & Tanguy van 
Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J.L. & ECON. 525 (2001) (suggesting government-
sponsored cash rewards as partial or full replacements for patents and to better address fields where the 
disparity between average cost and marginal cost is typically large, citing as examples biotechnology and 
computer software, which are both focal points in today’s debates about patentable subject matter). 
 19 For a general critique of rewards-focused approaches to patents, see F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights 
and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 705–17 (2001); and Daniel F. 
Spulber, Should Business Method Inventions Be Patentable?, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 265, 298–304 (2011). 
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putative patent infringers, bring to the attention of the government the rest of 
the relevant information needed to evaluate the patent when the patent is 
asserted against them, in court or during patent office reexamination.20 
To be sure, the incentive to invent is well supported by a host of factors 
that are likely to exist in the absence of a patent system, including invention’s 
famous mother, necessity, as well as innate curiosity and the funding of basic 
research, each of which is to be celebrated. The point here is to highlight some 
important benefits that come from having the patent system focus on getting 
inventions commercialized rather than on only getting inventions made. 
Getting an invention commercialized requires coordination of a large 
number of complementary users of an invention, including venture capitalists, 
managers, marketers, laborers, and often the owners of other inventions. But 
getting these diverse actors coordinated is not that difficult when inventions 
can be patented and those patents can be enforced under systems having 
relatively low administrative costs and less reliance on flexible discretion over 
subjective factors. When an inventor has a patent backed up by credible 
enforcement in court, then that patent can act like a beacon in a dark room to 
draw to itself all of those interested in that technology and start conversations 
among them.21 As long as the patent is predictably enforced, this beacon effect 
is followed by a bargain effect because those parties know that only those who 
strike deals with each other involving the patent can avoid being excluded by 
the patent in court.22 Through the enforcement of that patent right and those 
contract rights, the government is able to help patentees and their contracting 
parties appropriate the returns to any of their rival inputs to developing and 
commercializing innovation—labor, lab space, capital, etc.—without the 
government itself having to trace the relative contributions of each 
participant.23 This decentralized, ad hoc coordination occurs spontaneously, 
without the government needing to amass any of the specified information it 
would need to directly target each of the parties.24 Instead, each party brings its 
own expertise and other assets to the negotiating table and knows—without 
necessarily having to reveal it to other parties or the government—enough 
 
 20 Kieff, supra note 19, at 712.  
 21 F. Scott Kieff, On Coordinating Transactions in Intellectual Property: A Response to Smith’s 
Delineating Entitlements in Information, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 101, 102 (2007); see also Henry E. 
Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1751–
52 (2007). 
 22 See Kieff, supra note 21, at 102.  
 23 See Smith, supra note 21, at 1745. 
 24 Id. at 1763–65. 
DAILY&KEIFF GALLEYSPROOFS1 6/3/2013  10:29 AM 
974 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:967 
about its own level of interest and capability to decide whether to strike a deal 
or not. 
Just like the difference between the societal goals of inventing and 
commercializing reveals a significant difference in degree with respect to the 
relationship the government needs to have with market actors to implement a 
patent system, the difference between using court adjudication and 
administrative agency examination to assess patents reveals a significant 
difference in the nature of that same relationship. As explored in more detail in 
prior work, while court litigation is more expensive and time-consuming, it is 
also less open to political influence and its link between issues of patent 
validity and infringement provide important, self-disciplining effects on both 
patentees and alleged infringers.25 As a result, present trends toward increased 
reliance on administrative agency proceedings instead of court litigation may 
be expected to make it harder for new firms to enter and compete in markets. 
Larger firms are much more likely to bring political influence to bear in agency 
determinations, which also are less subject to that self-disciplining effect.26 
The discussion thus far has offered a thumbnail sketch of two basic choices 
a society can make about the patent system as an institution: overall goals and 
types of dispute resolution or enforcement. The particular choices a society 
makes on both of these basic fronts can tilt the system to favor those large, 
established market actors who will be better able to wield political influence 
than smaller market entrants. The discussions that follow will show how a 
similar anticompetitive effect can be caused by certain approaches to the more 
legally technical doctrine known as patentable subject matter. 
III.  ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO THE PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER 
DOCTRINE 
Written against a background in which disputes were known to have arisen 
about what types of subject matter would even be eligible for patent protection, 
and in which several types of subject matter had temporarily been ruled out of 
 
 25 See F. Scott Kieff, The Case for Preferring Patent-Validity Litigation over Second-Window Review 
and Gold-Plated Patents: When One Size Doesn’t Fit All, How Could Two Do the Trick?, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 
1937, 1949–50 (2009) [hereinafter Kieff, The Case for Preferring]; F. Scott Kieff, The Case for Registering 
Patents and the Law and Economics of Present Patent-Obtaining Rules, 45 B.C. L. REV. 55, 118–22 (2003) 
[hereinafter Kieff, The Case for Registering].  
 26 Kieff, The Case for Preferring, supra note 25, at 1949. 
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bounds, the 1952 Patent Act explicitly ruled everything in.27 The statute 
provides in its first provisions (§§ 100 and 101) of the chapter setting forth the 
substantive requirements for obtaining a patent that “[w]hoever invents or 
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition 
of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent 
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”28 It further 
defines the term invention to mean “invention or discovery,” and the term 
process to mean “process, art or method, [including] a new use of a known 
process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material.”29 The 
linguistic work these statutory clauses were set up to accomplish is simple: 
breadth. That is why the lists are exemplary, not restrictive; the restrictions on 
obtaining a patent come through the requirements listed elsewhere in the 
statute. For example, even the mention in this statutory text of the word new 
has not been read to provide any separate novelty requirement beyond the 
novelty and nonobviousness requirements that are more famously associated 
with other statutory provisions.30 
Despite the plain textual meaning and evident historical context of the 1952 
Patent Act, the courts eventually reintroduced the set of subjective limitations 
on patentable subject matter. The leadoff case in the Supreme Court was the 
1972 Gottschalk v. Benson decision, in which the Court read in to the 
patentable subject matter requirement some vague notions of the other 
substantive patentability requirements that are more generally known: novelty, 
nonobviousness, and disclosure.31 It was followed a few years later by the 
 
 27 Kieff, The Case for Registering, supra note 25, at 106; see also In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 985–90 
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Newman, J., dissenting), aff’d sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010); 
Michael Risch, America’s First Patents, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1279, 1286–94 (2012). But see Joshua D. Sarnoff, 
Patent-Eligible Inventions After Bilski: History and Theory, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 53 (2011). 
 28 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 29 35 U.S.C. § 100(a)–(b) (amended 2011). 
 30 See P.J. Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.A. 1 (West 1954), reprinted in 75 J. 
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 161, 178 (1993) (“The general part of the Committee Report states that 
section 102 ‘may be said to describe the statutory novelty required for patentability, and includes, in effect, an 
amplification and definition of ‘new’ in section 101.’”); see also In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 960 (C.C.P.A. 
1979) (“Notwithstanding the words ‘new and useful’ in § 101, the invention is not examined under that statute 
for novelty because that is not the statutory scheme of things or the long-established administrative practice.”), 
vacated sub nom. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980). 
 31 409 U.S. 63 (1972). For example, the Court’s analysis in Benson begins by citing to older cases on the 
radio, telegraph, and telephone—e.g., MacKay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 94 
(1939); O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853); The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1 (1888)—as though 
they stand for the proposition that a claim may be so abstract and sweeping as to cover both the “known and 
unknown.” See Benson, 409 U.S. at 67–69. But this line of reasoning essentially imports into the patentable 
subject matter analysis concerns that are addressed by the other substantive patent law requirements of 
DAILY&KEIFF GALLEYSPROOFS1 6/3/2013  10:29 AM 
976 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:967 
1978 Parker v. Flook decision.32 In Flook, the Court was more explicit in 
reading the novelty, nonobviousness, and disclosure requirements into the 
patentable subject matter inquiry.33 
The double-dipping approach to the patentable subject matter test the Court 
used in Benson and Flook can be problematic because it has often become a 
highly subjective inquiry that largely turns on a court’s own reasoning to 
determine whether “the patent claims add enough . . . to qualify as patent-
eligible processes that apply natural laws.”34 This problem would be 
exacerbated if, as some advocate, courts were encouraged (or even required) to 
make determinations on the issue of patentable subject matter a question 
appropriate for summary, policy-based, discretionary determination at the early 
phases of a patent litigation, long before a factual record is developed.35 
Because courts, like other government organizations, are also subject to 
political influence, this type of subjective standard leaves them favoring those 
large, established companies better able to muster the expensive government 
communications and outreach efforts needed to bring cases to the Supreme 
Court.36 It has long been recognized in the patent community that the Benson 
decision was the direct result of exactly that type of influence,37 and the several 
published opinions by the en banc Federal Circuit in the later Alappat38 
decision make the record explicit while disagreeing with each other over the 
 
novelty, nonobviousness, and disclosure. Furthermore, as Adam Mossoff has shown, such fears about the 
preclusive effects of these historical patents are far overblown. See Adam Mossoff, The Rise and Fall of the 
First American Patent Thicket: The Sewing Machine War of the 1850s, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 165, 203–05 (2011).  
 32 See 437 U.S. 584, 600 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“The Court today . . . strikes what seems to me 
an equally damaging blow at basic principles of patent law by importing into its inquiry under 35 U.S.C. § 101 
[regarding patentable subject matter] the criteria of novelty and inventiveness [which is also known as 
nonobviousness].”). 
 33 See id. at 586, 594 (majority opinion) (requiring an “inventive application” or “inventive concept” and 
discussing the application’s failure to adequately define the input variables of the claimed formula).  
 34 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1297 (2012).  
 35 See MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn Corp., 672 F.3d 1250, 1264 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Mayer, J., dissenting) 
(“The issue of whether a claimed method meets the subject matter eligibility requirements contained in 35 
U.S.C. § 101 is an ‘antecedent question’ that must be addressed before this court can consider whether 
particular claims are invalid as obvious or anticipated.”); SmartGene, Inc. v. Advanced Biological Labs., SA, 
852 F. Supp. 2d 42, 51 (D.D.C. 2012) (holding that the patent claims were not directed to patentable subject 
matter and noting that “a 35 U.S.C. § 101 subject matter patentability inquiry is the threshold analysis for 
determining patent validity”).  
 36 See John F. Duffy, The Federal Circuit in the Shadow of the Solicitor General, 78 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 518 (2010) (showing how lobbying efforts before the Solicitor General’s Office can influence outcomes 
in Supreme Court patent cases). 
 37 See, e.g., infra notes 39–40. 
 38 In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc), abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008) (en banc).  
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possible nullifying impact of a similar politically influenced process.39 As 
Judge Rich explained when endeavoring to ascertain the cause and effect of 
Benson in In re Johnston: 
I find it more significant to contemplate the identities of the troops 
lined up for battle in Benson and observe which side obtained the 
victory. On the one side was the Government, against patenting 
programs or software, supported by the collective forces of major 
hardware (i.e., computer) manufacturers and their representative 
associations who, for economic reasons, did not want patents granted 
on programs for their machines. On the other side was Benson et al. 
and their assignee and assorted lawyers and legal groups who were in 
favor of patent protection for programs or software. The anti-
patenting forces won the victory . . . .40 
To be sure, the image to keep in mind is not that courts and other 
government organizations—or the officials within them—are receiving 
inappropriate payoffs or other forms of influence. To the contrary, it makes 
sound sense for government organizations and officials to seek out and receive 
information about how their actions can best impact society, and interested 
members of society are exercising a vital First Amendment constitutional right 
to speak to their government. 
The reason for concern is that the result has been reliance on an additional 
subjective standard that is duplicative of more objective standards embodied in 
the other substantive patentability requirements that are more generally known, 
namely novelty, nonobviousness, and disclosure. The addition of this easily 
influenced test for patentability is what further tilts the playing field in favor of 
those large, established companies better able to muster the expensive 
 
 39 See F. Scott Kieff, Welcome to Patent Purgatory, DEFINING IDEAS (June 9, 2011), http://www.hoover. 
org/publications/defining-ideas/article/81626.  
The elimination of effective patent protection for computer software through the Supreme 
Court’s 1972 Benson decision was the direct result of intensive influence wielded by Nicholas 
Katzenbach, who became general counsel of IBM in 1969, over the U.S. Department of Justice, 
which he formerly ran as Attorney General during the Kennedy/Johnson Administration. And a 
similar influence was applied, albeit ultimately unsuccessfully, during the first Bush 
[A]dministration, in the lead up to the 1994 appellate court Alappat decision. The Patent Office 
Commissioner had made the decision to reconstitute the office’s internal Board of Appeals to 
hold a rehearing before a specially packed Board designed to reject the patent on a type of 
software. 
Id. 
 40 In re Johnston, 502 F.2d 765, 774 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (Rich, J., dissenting), rev’d sub nom. Dann v. 
Johnston, 425 U.S. 219 (1976).  
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government communications and outreach efforts, which has given their voices 
an outsized effect compared to the voices of smaller, market-challenging 
competitors. 
While the Benson and Flook approach established a beachhead in the 
debates about patentable subject matter, the broader view embodied in the 
1952 Patent Act successfully pushed back almost immediately. In the 1980 and 
1981 decisions in Diamond v. Chakrabarty and Diamond v. Diehr, the Court 
rejected efforts to exclude from patentable subject matter inventions relating to 
biotechnology and software, respectively.41 In both of these cases, the Court 
pointed out that “Congress intended statutory subject matter to ‘include 
anything under the sun that is made by man.’”42 
There are good reasons to think that it was this return to the broad view of 
patentable subject matter that played a crucial role in the relative success of the 
U.S. markets for both biotechnology and software.43 After the 1980 
Chakrabarty decision, the U.S. biotechnology sector enjoyed far more 
certainty about eligibility for patent protection than the same sectors in Europe 
and Japan, and only in the United States was there remarkable growth in the 
number of small- and medium-sized biotechnology companies and a drastic 
increase in the number of new drugs and new medical devices brought to 
market.44 Contrary to the expectations of some commentators, widespread 
patenting in biotechnology did not lead to a patent thicket or anticommons, nor 
did it result in significant restrictions on research.45 Similarly, while there was 
 
 41 See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
 42 Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 
(1952)); accord Diehr, 450 U.S. at 182 (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 
(1952)). 
 43 See Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen Idec, 659 F.3d 1057, 1075 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Rader, C.J., 
additional views) (discussing how, “with some considerable blame on its eligibility doctrines, Europe lost 
innovation investment to the United States”); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark 
Office (Myriad I), 653 F.3d 1329, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Moore, J., concurring in part) (“This outpouring of 
scientific creativity, spurred by the patent system, reflects a substantial investment of time and money by the 
biotechnology industry to obtain property rights related to DNA sequences.”), vacated sub nom. Ass’n for 
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012).  
 44 See Heather Hamme Ramirez, Comment, Defending the Privatization of Research Tools: An 
Examination of the “Tragedy of the Anticommons” in Biotechnology Research and Development, 53 EMORY 
L.J. 359, 359 (2004) (“Since 1992, the number of biotech patents granted has increased substantially, and the 
industry has more than tripled in size. New biotech drug and vaccine approvals rose from two in 1982 to 
thirty-five in 2002.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Kieff, supra note 3, at 411–12. 
 45 See Timothy Caulfield et al., Evidence and Anecdotes: An Analysis of Human Gene Patenting 
Controversies, 24 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1091, 1092 (2006); Richard A. Epstein & Bruce N. Kuhlik, Is 
There a Biomedical Anticommons?, REGULATION, Summer 2004, at 54; Kieff, supra note 3, at 391–96; Kieff, 
supra note 21, at 106–09; Mossoff, supra note 31, at 168–70. Biotechnology research has also not been 
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no reliable protection for software patents after Benson and Flook essentially 
until after the 1994 Alappat decision,46 that later period in which software 
patents enjoyed meaningful protection is when Google arrived with a portfolio 
of strong patents and trade secrets and soon grew to become Microsoft’s 
largest competitive threat.47 
Despite the success of the broad approach to patentable subject matter in 
biotechnology and software, the Supreme Court has recently returned to the 
narrow approach of Benson and Flook. In the 2010 Bilski v. Kappos decision 
and the 2012 Mayo v. Prometheus decision, the Court again imported into the 
patentable subject matter inquiry a vague and substantively duplicative version 
of the novelty, nonobviousness, and disclosure requirements.48 Taken together, 
Bilski and Mayo create what some have called an “I know it when I see it” test 
 
impeded by aggressive enforcement against researchers. See Myriad IV, 689 F.3d 1303, 1331 (Fed. Cir.) 
(“[P]atents are rarely enforced against scientific research, even during their terms.”), cert. granted in part, 133 
S. Ct. 694, 694–95 (2012). The recent Myriad and Mayo cases involved commercial competitors rather than 
scientists engaged in basic research, and in Myriad the patent challengers had to provoke a dispute via a 
declaratory judgment action. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1296 
(2012); Myriad I, 653 F.3d at 1345, 1348. 
 46 In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc), abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
 47 According to its own patent information database, Google is the original assignee of over 730 U.S. 
patents. See Advanced Patent Search, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/advanced_patent_search (last visited 
Feb. 9, 2013). The number of patents was determined by searching the database for issued patents where 
Google is the original assignee. U.S. Patent 6,285,999, the patent on PageRank, the foundational algorithm for 
Google’s search technology, is owned by Stanford University and exclusively licensed to Google. See U.S. 
Patent No. 6,285,999 (filed Jan. 9, 1998); Richard Brandt, Starting Up: How Google Got Its Groove, 
STANFORD MAG., http://alumni.stanford.edu/get/page/magazine/article/?article_id=35436 (last visited May 28, 
2013). In 2012 Google obtained 17,000 patents as part of its acquisition of Motorola Mobility. Steve Lohr, On 
Google, F.T.C. Set Rules of War over Patents, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2013, at B1. While Google recently 
committed to antitrust authorities to limit its own ability to enforce those newly acquired patents to the extent 
they are subject to enforceable commitments to be licensed on fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory 
(FRAND) terms, that new commitment does not appear to reach all of the newly acquired patents or any of the 
patents within Google’s treasure trove of original patents on search. In re Motorola Mobility LLC, No. 
1210120, at 4, 7 (Jan. 3, 2013), http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1210120/130103googlemotorolado.pdf. 
Furthermore, such a high-profile case imposing limits on enforceability of FRAND-related patents may set a 
precedent that plays out to the advantage of Google and other large companies when defending against patent 
infringement allegations.  
 48 See Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1302 (stating that broad claims foreclose future invention and tie up future use 
of laws of nature); id. at 1297 (stating claims must “add enough to their statements of the correlations to allow 
the processes they describe to qualify as patent-eligible processes that apply natural laws”); Bilski v. Kappos, 
130 S. Ct. 3218, 3229 (2010) (plurality opinion) (discussing the need to set a higher bar for patentable subject 
matter because some business method patents are vague and of “suspect validity”); id. at 3231 (majority 
opinion) (holding the claimed invention patent ineligible because its claims were overbroad and relied on a 
“long prevalent” economic practice and “well-known . . . techniques”).  
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for patent eligibility.49 If these new precedents play out that way, then the test 
for patentable subject matter may have again become subject to the influence 
of larger, more-established industrial parties due to their ability to better 
communicate with agencies like the Patent Office and courts, including the 
Supreme Court. 
CONCLUSION 
There are several possible consequences of the Court’s return to a narrow 
view of patentable subject matter. For example, the restriction on the 
patentability of financial and business methods may constrain the 
commercialization of new technologies and lead to a loss of the economic 
efficiency that could be provided if new business methods were 
commercialized more rapidly and broadly.50 
A more immediate consequence may have been a decline in the value of 
biotechnology companies.51 This may suggest a similar effect will be seen for 
companies that rely on business method and software patents. This decline in 
value may be exacerbated by a decrease in venture capital funding.52 Given 
that venture capital funding is correlated with patenting,53 this may result in an 
overall decrease in investment in new technologies and their 
commercialization. 
Weaker patents also tend to give more power to large, established 
companies at the expense of smaller companies, startups, and individual 
inventors.54 Combined with an overall trend toward consolidation in these 
industries,55 this may have significant anticompetitive effects.56 A potential 
 
 49 Kevin Emerson Collins, Bilski and the Ambiguity of “an Unpatentable Abstract Idea,” 15 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 37, 39 (2011). 
 50 Spulber, supra note 19, at 287–88. 
 51 See, e.g., Brent Kendall et al., Top Court Decision Alarms Biotechs, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 2012, at A1 
(reporting a 5.2% drop in the value of Myriad Genetics stock out of concern that its patents could be 
invalidated in the wake of Mayo). 
 52 Jonathan D. Rockoff & Pui-Wing Tam, Biotech Funding Gets Harder to Find, WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 
2012, at B1. 
 53 Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System: Results of the 2008 
Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255, 1281 (2009). 
 54 See Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., 128 F.2d 632, 643 (2d Cir. 1942) (Frank, J., concurring); Kieff, 
supra note 3, at 411; Kieff, supra note 21, at 105.  
 55 See, e.g., Cyrus Sanati, A Different Kind of Drug Deal, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Apr. 17, 2009, 7:10 
AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/04/17/a-different-kind-of-drug-deal/ (reporting on the rapid 
consolidation in the pharmaceutical industry). 
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consequence may be lower rates of commercializing innovation and higher 
prices as larger companies no longer feel as much pressure from an already 
reduced number of new market entrants. Returning to a broad view of 
patentable subject matter may significantly mitigate such risks. 
 
 
 56 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein et al., The FTC, IP, and SSOs: Government Hold-Up Replacing Private 
Coordination, 8 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1, 2 (2012) (exploring example of an administrative agency 
applying subjective tests for various patent-related issues. in a way that ends up substituting a small likelihood 
of a small hold up effect caused by property rights in patents with a large likelihood of a large hold up effect 
caused by the government in coordination with large market participants to the disadvantage of market 
entrants). 
